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Background: The remuneration system of General Practitioners (GPs) has changed in several countries in the past
decade. The aim of our study was: to establish the effect of these changes on the revenues and income of GPs in
the first decade of the 21st century.
Methods: Annual GP revenue and practice costs were collected from national institutes in the eight countries
included in our study (Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, The Netherlands, Sweden, The United Kingdom
(UK)) from 2000–2010. The data were corrected for inflation and purchasing power. Data on the remuneration systems
and changes herein were collected from the European Observatory Health Systems Reviews and country experts.
Results: Comprehensive changes in the remuneration system of GPs were associated with considerable changes in
GP income. Incremental changes mainly coincided with a gradual increase in income after correction for inflation.
Average GP income was higher in countries with a strong primary care structure.
Conclusions: The gap between the countries where GPs have a lower income (Belgium, Sweden, France and Finland)
and the countries where GPs have a higher income (Netherlands, Germany and the UK) continues to exist over time
and appeared to be related to dimensions of primary care, such as governance and access. New payment forms, such
as integrated care payment systems, and new health care professionals that are working for GPs, increasingly blur the
line between practice costs and income, making it more and more important to clearly define expenditures on GPs,
to remain sight on the actual income of GPs.
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The remuneration system of GPs provides incentives,
intended and unintended, for GP behaviour. For in-
stance, fee-for-service payments are expected to provide
incentives for GPs to treat patients in their own practice
as long as possible instead of referring them to other
health care providers. With salary and capitation systems
there will be a risk of unnecessary referrals to other
(more costly) health care providers [1-5]. However, in
practice, GPs also face non-financial incentives, ethical
considerations and professional standards [6]. The in-
centives of payment systems probably get considerable* Correspondence: m.kroneman@nivel.nl
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reproduction in any medium, provided the orattention, because they can be more easily changed by
policy makers than other incentives [7]. During the past
decade, new payment systems have been introduced,
such as pay-for-performance and integrated care pay-
ments. Currently it is not known to what extent these
changes have influenced the income of GPs. In a previ-
ous paper [8] on the remuneration and income of Ge-
neral Practitioners (GPs) covering the period from 1990
to 2005 in eight European countries (Belgium, Denmark,
Finland, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden and
the United Kingdom), we showed that: 1) in some coun-
tries (Germany, Netherlands, UK) GPs earn more than
in others (Belgium, France, Sweden), 2) these differences
remained rather stable over time, and 3) the incomes of
British GPs increased disproportionally after the 2004
remuneration reforms [8,9]. As we were aware that thetral Ltd. This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
ommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
iginal work is properly cited.
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forms took place, we decided to update our study and to
analyse the period 2000–2010 in more detail (using
annual intervals instead of the 5-year intervals in our
previous study) and to focus on the effects of remune-
ration reforms on the revenues and incomes of GPs. Our
previous study [8] showed that gate-keeping GPs had a
systematically higher income compared to GPs in coun-
tries where patients had direct access to secondary
care. Data on GP’s tasks were not available at that
time. Recently, a comprehensive European study into
the strength of primary care has been published, and
we have used these data to see whether a strong pri-
mary care sector is related to higher payments of GPs
[10]. Differences in income levels of GPs in different
countries may be related to the importance and the
role of primary care in the health care system (we will
refer to this as the strength of primary care). We ex-
pect that in health systems with a strong primary care,
where general practice has a more comprehensive role
compared to specialist care, GPs have a higher income
than GPs in countries with a weaker primary care sector.
Consequently, this paper will address the following
questions:
1. How did the income of GPs develop from 2000 to
2010 in the eight countries in our study (Belgium,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, the
Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom)?
2. Have there been comprehensive changes in the
payment systems and did these affect the income
of GPs?
3. Is the income level of GPs related to the strength of
primary care in these countries?
Methods
Operationalizations
We collected annual data on GP-revenues for each
country in our study. We distinguish three different re-
venue components: total revenue, practice costs and in-
come. The total revenue is the amount the GP receives
through the remuneration system. For those countries
where GPs are self-employed or entrepreneurs, practice
costs (consisting of e.g. salary of practice assistants,
housing, ICT, transportation and disposables) have to
be deducted from the total revenue to calculate income
(before taxes). In countries where GPs receive a salary,
only data on salaries were collected, since the employer
in that case covers practice costs. The income of a GP is
presented as the income for a full-time GP after deduction
of practice expenses and before income taxes and ex-
cludes income from out-of-hours care. The data come
from national institutes, most of them are routinely col-
lected data on GP revenues. National data were convertedinto Purchasing Power Parities US$ (pppUS$) to make
the data comparable across countries while allowing for
possible differences in purchasing power. The data were
then corrected for inflation, with the year 2000 as refe-
rence year (Consumer Price Index). Data on pppUS$
conversion rates and inflation were taken from the OECD
health data files 2010 [11].
Comprehensive versus incremental remuneration changes
In this study, we distinguish two types of changes of the
remuneration system: comprehensive and incremental
changes. We define a comprehensive change as being
introduced at a certain point in time (more or less over-
night) and changing the main way in which GPs are
remunerated (for example from capitation fee to fee-
for-service). Incremental changes add new elements to
the existing remuneration system or changes the balance
between several remuneration types, which are intro-
duced gradually, taking several years to come into full
effect (for example, the introduction of a fee for keeping
patient’s records, extending the number of patients for
which the fee is applicable over the years).
Strength of primary care
A recent European wide study by Kringos [10] into the
strength of primary care distinguished between the pri-
mary care structure (using the following dimensions:
governance, economic conditions of primary care and
primary care workforce development) and the primary
care process (access to primary care services, compre-
hensiveness, continuity and coordination of primary
care). On each of the seven dimensions countries were
scored from strong to weak on a three point scale. Fur-
thermore a score for total strength of the primary care
sector was computed. We will briefly discuss each di-
mension constructed by Kringos [10]. The governance of
primary care refers to the existence of primary care po-
licies and regulations (e.g. on the location of primary
care providers and facilities), and the development of the
workforce for primary care refers to the workload, age
and training of family physicians [12,13]. The accessibi-
lity of primary care was measured by the national and
geographic supply of primary care services, the way ac-
cess is organized in primary care practices (e.g. the use
of appointment systems, and the organization of out-of-
hours care), and the affordability and acceptability of pri-
mary care services as perceived by patients. Continuity
of primary care was measured by conditions for an en-
during doctor-patient relationship (e.g. whether patients
are registered with a primary care doctor), provisions to
ensure informational continuity of care (e.g. the use of
electronic clinical record systems), and elements of the
quality of the doctor-patient relationship (e.g. patient
perceived available consultation time). Coordination of
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keeping system, the skill-mix of primary care providers
(e.g. % mixed practices with general practitioners and
medical specialists; the frequency of face-to-face meetings
between general practitioners and other primary care pro-
viders), the collaboration within primary care and with
secondary care providers (e.g. how common it is for ge-
neral practitioners to receive clinical lessons by a medical
specialist, or for medical specialists to visit a primary care
practice to provide joint care with general practitioners),
and the integration of certain public health functions in
primary care (e.g. whether clinical patient records from
primary care are used at regional or local level to identify
health needs or priorities for health policy; or whether
community health surveys are regularly conducted for
public health purposes). The comprehensiveness of pri-
mary care was measured by the breadth of services offered
to patients at primary care level (e.g. medical technical
procedures and certain preventive services). For our study,
we could not use the dimension “economic conditions”
because GP income was one of the elements of this di-
mension. The operationalisation of the dimensions and
measurement methods have been described by Kringos
2012 [10]. For our study, for each dimension we averaged
the income of the countries that scored strong on that
dimension and of the countries that scored medium
and weak. We then plotted the development in average
income over the years for the average income for strong
and medium/weak scoring countries. Additional file 1:
Table S9 provides an overview of which countries in our
study scored strong or medium/weak for each dimension.
Health care expenditure
Data on health care expenditure were retrieved from the
OECD online health database. We related GP income to
total health care expenditure on individual health care
services (including hospital care, but excluding public
health care) and to expenditures on basic medical and
diagnostic services, both in pppUS$ per capita. For a de-
tailed description, see the OECD website [14]. In the
OECD database, no data were available for the UK on
these items.
Substantial increase in income
For this study, we define a substantial increase in GP in-
come as follows: when the increase is more than the GDP
per capita corrected for inflation, we consider the increase
as substantial. We look at the increase of GP income
in two ways. Firstly, we look at the minimum and the
maximum GP income in a certain country in the period
under study. Secondly, for countries with comprehensive
changes in the remuneration system, we look at the in-
come in the year before the change and the maximum
income in the years after the change. The average GDPper capita for the countries included in this study is
29,660 pppUS$ (price level 2000). The minimum average
GDP per capita in the past decade is found in France
(27,285 pppUS$, price level 2000) and the maximum in
The Netherlands (31,472 pppUS$, price level 2000). For a
comparison with annual wage development in the popula-
tion, we used OECD Statistics, i.e. the dataset on average
annual wages, in 2009 pppUS$ and 2009 constant prices.
The development in annual wages was recalculated using
an index with the year 2000 = 100.
Data sources for GP revenue and practice costs
The countries in our studies can be divided into two
groups. The first group consists of the countries that
routinely collect data on GP remuneration and practice
costs. This is the case in Germany (for public practice
only), Finland, France, and the UK. The second group of
countries (Belgium, Denmark and the Netherlands) do
not routinely collect these data and the income of GPs
had to be calculated from other sources, such as public
expenditure on GP-care and incidental studies into prac-
tice costs. For Belgium, no reliable data source for prac-
tice costs was available and thus an estimate was used.
For Sweden, where multiple remuneration systems exist,
only information on GPs in salaried service was avail-
able. The data used for the calculation of total revenue,
practice costs and income for each country are available
in Additional file 1. Additional file 1 provides the ori-
ginal data per country before correcting for inflation and
purchasing power differences, in the original currency of
the particular country.
Data on changes in GP remuneration 2000–2010
Data on changes in the remuneration system for General
Practitioners were collected from the Health System Re-
view series published by the European Observatory on
Health Systems and Policy and the study of Kroneman
et al on GP-income from 1975–2005 [8,9]. This informa-
tion was checked, updated and completed with the help of
national experts. National experts were persons working in
the field of GP care or payment of GPs either at national
governments, national (GP) institutes or universities,
depending on the situation of each country and were
mainly existing contact persons from our previous study.
Ethical approval was not required for this study.
Results and discussion
Changes in the remuneration systems
Belgium
GPs in Belgium are mainly paid a fee-for-service. To
strengthen primary care, in 1999 the General Medical File
(GMF) allowance was introduced for patients of 60 years
and older. GPs receive an allowance for all persons for
whom they coordinate their medical files. In 2001 the age
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population could apply for this GMF coordination [15].
The GMF allowance can be seen as a kind of capitation
fee. The share of the capitation fee in GP revenue has in-
creased over time to 11% of the insurance-based revenue
(including revenue from out-of-pocket payments) in 2010.
Since 2008, also for consultations on weekdays between
18.00-21.00 hours an extra remuneration is received. Se-
veral lumpsum payments, such as a lumpsum for accredi-
tation, for settlement (introduced around 2003), a lumpsum
for GMF (introduced around 2002), which is additional to
the GMF revenue per patient were introduced in the last
decade. The GMF lumpsum was replaced by a practice
lumpsum in 2008 and a lumpsum for ICT (introduced
around 2003). However, no information is available on these
lumpsums. In 2009, an integrated care fee for diabetes and
chronic kidney disease was introduced. Besides the intro-
duction of the GMF allowance, there have been no compre-
hensive changes in the remuneration system since 2000.
The GMF allowance was introduced gradually over the
years. In 2003 there was an increase of 23% in the GMF-
tariff per patient and in 2008 the coverage of the GMF in-
creased by 18%. Also in 2008, a supplement of three euro
per consultation for out-of-hours consultations was intro-
duced. This resulted in a strong increase in revenue over
the years [16], making the remuneration of the GP profes-
sion as attractive as other medical specialties (e.g. psychia-
trists, paediatricians). An extension of the coverage of
health insurance – self employed persons got the same
rights as salaried workers in 2008 - resulted in an increase
of the official insurance revenues. However, this probably
did not increase the total revenues (insurance plus non-
insurance) for a GP, assuming that the demand for GP
care for self employed persons did not change due to re-
form. Patients usually pay the GP out-of-pocket and then
claim reimbursement from their sickness funds, if appli-
cable [15]. Fee levels for GP-care are negotiated between
sickness funds and representatives of the physicians [17].
Denmark
In Denmark, the GPs derive their revenues from a com-
bination of a capitation fee, which makes up one third to
a half of their revenues, and from fees for services ren-
dered (per consultation, examination, procedure etc.). In
the period from 2003 to 2010 there were no significant
changes in the remuneration system but only small adjust-
ments in the fees and the types of fees. Priority setting of
certain services is introduced in the form of, for example,
comparatively high fees for preventive consultations. This
higher fee is supposed to encourage GPs to offer longer
consultations focusing on broader health and prevention
activities such as education regarding smoking or dietary
habits, weight control, and so on [18]. In 2006, episode-
of-care payment was introduced for patients with diabetes.This fee consisted of a total payment for all consultations
given to the patient during one year. It is voluntary for
doctors to engage in the program and only a small num-
ber of doctors have chosen to do so. GPs receive remune-
ration for the activities of their practice nurses. We do not
have information on whether this revenue covers the costs
of these practice nurses.
Finland
For general practitioners, who generally work in health
centres, two payment systems exist. Traditionally, pay-
ment is mainly based on a monthly salary with additional
payments based on, among other factors, seniority and
skills. Work that exceeds 37 hours a week is remunerated
in addition to the salary. The second system is called the
personal doctor system, which is a special remuneration
formula determined by a basic salary (which can be only
about 60–85% of the monthly salary from the traditional
system), that is supplemented by a payment per consul-
tation for patients who consult their GP less than three
times in the previous year and a monthly “capitation” pay-
ment for the so-called frequent visitors - those who visited
their GP more than three times in the previous year. This
programme leads to higher total revenues compared to
the traditional system, but the GP is not protected by the
limit of 37 hours per week, as there is no formal working
week, just a requirement to offer services on weekdays.
Towards the end of the decade, different local modifica-
tions of two “official” systems have become more com-
mon. Also some municipalities with the personal doctor
system have decided to change back to the “traditional”
system with doctors having 37 hours per week working
time and receiving a salary. Comprehensive changes in
the remuneration system have not taken place in the past
decade. Another trend during the past 10 years in the
municipal sector has been the outsourcing of GP services
to private companies. Usually these private companies
have their own remuneration system for doctors. Unfortu-
nately current and comparable data on doctors’ salaries
employed by these companies are not available.
France
General Practitioners in France are mainly paid on a fee-
for-service basis. In 2001 supplementary payment was
introduced for GPs that registered patients for gate-
keeping purposes (“Médecin référent”, referring phy-
sician). For each registered patient an extra fee of €46
was introduced [19]. However in 2003, only 1% of the
patients and 10% of the GPs joined the programme, and
therefore this programme was discontinued. In 2005 the
“Médecin traitant” (treating physician) was introduced.
This physician manages patients with long-term dis-
eases, receiving €40 per patient per year for this activity.
In March 2007, 82% of the insured population had
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Patients who don’t register with a médecin traitant, or
who visit a specialist without consulting their médecin
traitant, receive lower reimbursement for the specialist’s
fee. The fees for GPs refer to statutory tariffs set out in
national agreements. A small part of the GPs (8% in
2008, called ‘sector 2’ physicians) are allowed to charge
higher tariffs [21]. However, this system is currently dis-
couraged and only available to physicians with special
skills, leading to a further decrease of the percentage of
GPs under this regime in the near future. Data on sector
2 physicians are not included in this study.
Since 2009 GPs may receive additional payment for
practice improvement. Contracts are signed with the
Social Health Insurance on a voluntary basis for a three-
year period and can be terminated at any time on the
doctor’s demand. The contract encourages GPs to de-
velop prevention, to improve treatment and to follow
patients with a range of chronic conditions (currently
hypertension and diabetes) and to improve efficiency
by increasing the rate of prescription of generic drugs.
GPs are offered additional remuneration on top of their
normal fee-for-service income. The additional payment
takes into account the size of the population treated by the
doctor and a number of quality indicators. In 2008, there
were 16 indicators for which final but also intermediate
targets were defined. Overall, the amount earned can ex-
ceed €7000 per year for a doctor achieving over 85% of
the targets and treating more than 1200 patients. There
is no penalty for GPs who do not achieve the targets.
Germany
Until 2008, the payment of ambulatory physicians (both
general practitioners and specialists) used to be subject to
a global spending cap tagged to the increase of the wage
base from which the statutory health insurance funds re-
ceived income-related contributions. This worked as a
two-stage process. First, the statutory health insurance
funds made total payments to physicians’ associations in
the form of negotiated capitation fees for each member
(insured person) of the fund. These negotiated budgets
were subsequently distributed among the members of the
physicians’ associations according to a uniform relative
value scale. This scale contained a list of all services that
can be provided by physicians for remuneration within
the statutory health insurance system. Each of these ser-
vices was awarded a certain number of points. Physi-
cians invoiced their associations each quarter for the
total number of points generated by the services ren-
dered. The monetary value of the points has been de-
rived by dividing the total negotiated budget (the
budget that the GP-unions received from the sickness
funds) by total number of points. The monetary value
of the points is then used to calculate the physicians’quarterly remuneration. To prevent physicians from
maximising the number of reimbursable points each
practice was awarded a budget according to its spe-
cialty reflecting within limits historical practice pat-
terns. In 2009 all ambulatory physician services were
awarded a Euro-value (based on the previous number
of points multiplied by 3.5001 eurocent) thus trans-
forming the uniform relative value scale into a fee
schedule. The spending cap was lifted to the extent
that physicians’ associations and statutory health in-
surance funds were collectively required to identify the
required budget to cover an expected service level as
defined by health risk adjustment (on the basis of age,
gender and documented diagnoses for the resident pa-
tient population). Prior to this, in 2008, the number of
individual services that are applicable for reimburse-
ment was reduced by bundling and the number of
capitation-like compensations for a complex of phy-
sician services per case (patient/practice/quarter of a
year) was increased. Besides, for each GP practice, the
maximum number of reimbursable services is settled
for each quarter of a year (targets). When a practice pro-
duces cases or points above its target, a reduced fee is
applicable to all additional services, which are regarded
as ‘overproduction’ [22-25].
The Netherlands
In 2006 the remuneration system for GPs changed sub-
stantially in the Netherlands. Before 2006, two types of
patients were distinguished: patients with compulsory
public insurance (about 2/3rd of the population) and pri-
vately insured patients. For publicly insured patients,
GPs received a fixed capitation fee, which was differenti-
ated by age of the patient and whether the patient lived
in a deprived area. For privately insured patients, GPs
charged fee-for-services (mostly consultations or home
visits) to the patients, who charged their health insu-
rance company for full or part reimbursement if GP
costs were included in the coverage. Prices were fixed
and set by the Dutch Healthcare Authority. After January
1st in 2006, all Dutch inhabitants had to buy the basic
package of health insurance, which included GP care.
The GPs became remunerated through a mixed system:
GPs receive for all patients a capitation fee (which is sig-
nificantly lower compared to the former capitation fee
for publicly insured patients) and a consultation fee that
differs for home visits, office consultations and telephone
consultations. The capitation fees are higher for older pa-
tients and patients living in deprived areas. Furthermore,
GPs can negotiate with health insurers for funding of
activities that either increase their efficiency or substi-
tute for secondary care. About 8-12% of the GPs re-
venue is generated via these negotiated activities (own
calculations, based on data provided by Vektis).
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GPs that are in salaried service of the independent GPs
(huisarts in dienst van een huisarts, HIDHAs). The share
of salaried GPs increased from 7% in 2000 to 12% in
2010 [26]. The income presented in this study is the
average income of self-employed GPs.
In 2010 a new type of remuneration was introduced:
integrated care remuneration, the so called chain-of-care
DRG (keten-DBC) for diabetes, COPD and CVA, con-
sisting of a lump-sum payment for each patient with one
of these diseases in the practice. With this money, all
care of these patients has to be paid, also care provided
by secondary health providers (hospitals and specialists).
Converted to an FTE GP, this results in an extra remu-
neration of 16.800 euro (about 6% of the total revenue).
At present, it is unclear how this money is spent in prac-
tice, and thus it is unknown what part is GP income and
which part consists of additional costs.
Sweden
In Sweden, county councils are responsible for ambula-
tory health care provision. Payments to primary care cen-
tres are normally based on all-in budgets, and payment
principles may vary between the county councils. Physi-
cians are in salaried service at primary care centres. As
such, they receive a monthly salary from the county coun-
cil. In some counties GPs receive an additional capitation
fee for each patient, to increase their monthly income. In
the last decades, the differentiation among the Swedish
counties has increased and nowadays there are as many
health care systems as there are counties (21) in Sweden,
with all counties operating with a different mix of salary,
capitation and fee-for-service for GPs, which makes it
impossible to determine “the” Swedish GP remuneration
system. In the period from 2000 to 2010, no major
changes have taken place, at least not at national level.
United Kingdom (England)
Before 2004, the revenues of GPs in the United Kingdom
were determined by a basic allowance, supplemented by
allowances based on factors including the number of
listed patients, patient characteristics (age, chronic con-
ditions, living in deprived areas) and some types of ser-
vices rendered. There was a slight gradient in basic
allowance due to seniority (depending on the number of
years a GP is registered).
In 2004, the payment system changed from GP-based to
practice-based, with an all-in budget (the global sum).
Payment was still based on characteristics of the practice”s
patient list, but additional revenues could be earned when
certain quality requirements were met (specified in the
quality and outcomes framework (QOF)). For this per-
formance payment, four domains for quality improvement
were introduced: the clinical domain (with an emphasison certain diseases), the organizational domain (inclu-
ding: information, communication, education and practice
management), the additional services domain (cervical
screening, child health surveillance, maternity services
and contraceptive services) and finally the patient experi-
ence domain which consists of how services are provided
and the involvement of patients in service development
plans. The UK is the first country in Europe to use patient
surveys to reward GP-practices. Revenues generated from
the QOF may increase total practice revenue by 15-20%
[27]. In the first two years of the contract, a total of 1050
points per year could be earned, with a value of £76 per
point in the first year and £125 per point in the second
year. The UK practices achieved over 90% of these avai-
lable points [27,28]. In the third year the number of points
to be earned dropped to 1000 [29]. In 2012/13 the value
per point was £134 [30]. Besides the global sum and the
quality and outcomes framework, practices may receive
remuneration for additional services that they may choose
to provide, the directly enhanced services. Examples are
screening for hazardous alcohol consumption and ex-
tended practice opening hours (three hours of extra ap-
pointment time per day).
There are two different contracts for GP-practices, the
General Medical Services contract (GMS) and the Per-
sonal Medical Services contract (PMS). The GMS is ne-
gotiated between the British Medical Association and
the NHS at the national level. The PMS is negotiated be-
tween local level health authorities (in particular, Pri-
mary Care Trusts) and individual GP-practices. The
income of PMS contracted GPs in 2008 is on average
higher compared to GMS-contracted GPs (about 16%,
calculation based on data from the Earnings and Ex-
penses Report 2007/2008 [31]). The share of PMS
contracted GPs has increased from about 4% in 2000 to
52% in 2010 [32,33]. Besides the contractor GPs, there is
a growing number of GPs who are working in salaried
service. These GPs earn on average £55,800 (87,000
pppUS$) in 2007–08 per FTE. Most of them work part
time (on average about 24 hours per week) [34].
Changes in paying the GP
Countries with a single remuneration system to pay the
GP do not exist anymore in 2010. Remuneration systems
for GPs have increased in complexity and detail. Even in
countries where (most) GPs are in salaried service, experi-
ments with additional payments in the form of, for ex-
ample, fee-for-service have been introduced. New forms
of payment that have been introduced in the past decade
are the integrated care fees and the performance fees.
The integrated care fee refers to a system where GPs re-
ceive an amount per patient with a certain diagnosis (for
example diabetes) and this amount should be used to
cover all health care costs of the specific patient, including
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which does not (yet) form a significant share of total rev-
enue. Integrated care fees have been introduced in Belgium,
Denmark, Germany, and The Netherlands (see Table 1).
Another innovation is the introduction of” performance
fees’, payments that are payable after a certain target is
reached. For instance, when a predefined percentage of the
high-risk population is vaccinated against influenza, the GP
receives a certain payment. Performance fees have been
introduced in France and the UK (see Table 1).
In the past decade, in the UK (in 2004), the Netherlands
(in 2006) and in Germany (in 2008), comprehensive
changes in the GP-remuneration system took place. In the
UK, the payment became practice based and performance
payments were introduced that formed a substantial part
of the practice income. In the Netherlands the difference
between the payment systems for publicly and privately
insured people was abolished and merged into one pay-
ment system for all citizens. For GPs it was difficult to
predict what would be the income under the new system
beforehand, since in the former system for the previously
publicly insured population no fee-for-service existed and
the existing administrative systems of the GPs did not
provide insight into the income generated in the new sys-
tem. In Germany, the budget cap was released, and al-
though there are reduced tariffs above a certain number
of reimbursable services, there is no limit in the number
of reimbursable services anymore. In the other countries
in our study incremental changes took place, varying from
an increase in tariffs for certain remuneration elements to
changes in the share of the different remuneration ele-
ments in the total revenue and the introduction of new
remuneration elements in addition to existing elements,
such as remuneration for keeping patient’s records. This
was the case in Belgium and France.Table 1 Main types of remuneration of GPs in eight countries
remuneration types compared to 2000
Salary Fee-for-service Capita-tion fee* Pe
Belgium Yes Yes
Denmark Yes Yes
Finland Yes Yes Yes
France Yes Yes Ye
Germany Yes
The Netherlands *** Yes Yes
Sweden Yes
UK (England) *** Yes Ye
If the text “Yes” is in italic, this type of remuneration is new for this country and if t
country in 2010 compared to the year 2000.
* Capitation fee here includes also the fees for keeping a patient’s record.
**The integrated care fee is fairly new and in none of the countries it forms a signif
*** In the Netherlands 7-12% of the GPs are in salaried employment with independ
working in salaried service, from 10% in 2004 to 19% in 2008 (including GPs workin
trainees (GP registrars) [34].Income development in the eight countries
In Figures 1 and 2, the income of GPs from 2000 to
2010 (or latest available year) is displayed (in pppUS$,
corrected for inflation and indexed with 2000 = 100).
Two of the countries with major changes in the remu-
neration system (the Netherlands and the UK) show a
substantial increase in income immediately after the re-
form and the subsequent two to three years. The total
increase exceeds the average growth in GDP per capita.
However, after about three years, the evolution of in-
come is decreasing again in both countries (although for
the Netherlands, only one year is available with a
lowered income, so it is not clear whether this is a con-
tinuous trend). In Germany, where the change was in-
troduced in 2008, in the next year an increase was
observed, but since the change was introduced only re-
cently, no data were available for the next years, so here
it is also not clear whether this is a trend. The increase
between 2008 and 2009 was less than the average growth
in GDP per capita. In the countries with incremental
changes, much lower increases were found. In Denmark,
Finland, France, and Sweden, the increase was less than
the average growth in GDP per capita. Only for Belgium,
the increase was substantial (more than one time the
average growth in GDP per capita).
Income development and the strength of primary care
The total strength of the primary care sector was not re-
lated to differences in GP income (Figure 3). When we
consider the key dimensions of primary care strength a
more clear association between primary care strength and
income development appeared. GPs working in countries
with strong primary care governance, a strongly developed
primary care workforce, accessible and well coordinated
care have a continuously higher income level than GPsin 2010 with new (italic) and changed (underlined)









he text is underlined, this type of remuneration has changed in that particular
icant share of the total revenue.
ent GPs in the past decade. In the UK, also a growing number of GPs in
g in salaried service and GPs who work flexible arrangements, excluding
Figure 1 GP-income development over time in pppUS$ and corrected for inflation (price level: 2000).
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sector. The difference over time in income of GPs working
in countries with strong and medium PC seemed to be ra-
ther stable. The increase in income seemed to be roughly
similar in both types of primary care systems. Overall, there
appears to be no relationship between the income level ofFigure 2 Relative income development of GPs (2000 = 100; for DenmGPs and the continuity of care provided by primary care
physicians. The comprehensiveness of primary care services
showed a striking relation with income: GP income in
countries with comprehensive primary care was on average
lower compared to countries with a less comprehensive
primary care system (see Figure 3).ark: 2003 = 100).
Overall PC strength Primary care process
Structure of primary care Primary care process
Structure of primary care Primary care process
Figure 3 Average GP income of countries scoring strong or medium/weak on dimension of primary care strength*. * Countries scoring
strong on the dimensions of primary care (included in calculating the red lines: Total strength: Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Netherlands, UK.
Governance: Denmark, Netherlands, UK. Workforce development: Denmark, Finland, Netherlands, UK. Primary care access: Denmark, Netherlands,
UK. Coordination of care: Denmark, Netherlands, Sweden, UK. Continuity of care: Denmark, Belgium, Germany. Comprehensiveness: Belgium,
Finland, France, Sweden, UK. The countries that are not mentioned here scored medium or weak on the different dimensions and are included in
calculating the blue lines.
Kroneman et al. BMC Health Services Research 2013, 13:436 Page 9 of 14
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/13/436Health care expenditure and GP income levels
In 2009 (for France: 2008) GP income was moderately cor-
related to expenditure on individual health care services
(pearson correlation coefficient = 0.60). Surprisingly, GP
income was negatively correlated to expenditure on basic
medical and diagnostic services (pearson correlation coef-
ficient = −0.45). The development in GP income over thedecade was strongly correlated with the development in
expenditure on basic medical and diagnostic services, with
correlation coefficients varying between 0.78 for Sweden
to 0.98 for Germany. There were two outliers: The
Netherlands (0.58) and France (0.32). For the Netherlands,
the length of the time series was only four years. For
France, there was a break in series that made comparison
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index (2000 = 100), we see that in Belgium the GP income
increased more compared to basic medical care expen-
diture and that in Denmark the expenditure increased
stronger than GP income (Figure 4). For the other coun-
tries the increase was more or less the same.
Income development of GPs in relation to GDP and
average income of the population
For all countries, in monetary terms corrected for infla-
tion, the largest increase in income between 2000 and
2009 took place in the Netherlands (more than two
times the average GDP per capita), followed by Belgium,
Germany and the UK, respectively (more than one timeFigure 4 Relative income development compared to relative develop
(OECD-data) per country, 100 = first year of data available in both tim
care. No data on expenditure in basic medical and diagnostic care availablthe average GDP per capita). In Sweden, France and
Denmark the lowest increase was found. The relative
change was highest in the Netherlands and lowest in
Denmark (see Figure 4). If we compare this with the
growth in GDP per capita corrected for inflation from
2000 to 2009 (which is between 3 and 15% in the coun-
tries in this study), we see that for all countries except
Denmark, the GP income has increased more than the
GDP per capita. When we compare the income develop-
ment of the total population from 2000 to 2009 with
GP-income development, we see that income of GPs in
Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands have increased
considerably more than the income of the average popu-
lation (more than 30%), the income of GPs in Finlandment in expenditure in basic medical and diagnostic care
e series. Exp. basic care: Expenditure in basic medical and diagnostic
e for France and UK.
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rage income of the total population, and the income of
GPs in France and Sweden have developed more or less
similar to the income of the average population. The
income development of GPs in Denmark remained
below the development of the average income in the
general population (−14%).
Practice costs
The share of practice costs in total revenue is rather
similar between countries, independent of the level of
income. The share is around 50% (varying from 46% in
France to 57% in the UK). Belgium formed an outlier:
the share here is 35%. However, the estimate of the prac-
tice costs for GPs in Belgium was not based on survey
or tax-based data, resulting in a less reliable estimate.
Discussion
When we look at the development of the income of the
GPs between 2000 and 2010, several conclusions can be
drawn. Firstly, the incomes of GPs in all countries except
Denmark have increased (corrected for inflation), and
increased more than the average income in the popu-
lation. The largest relative increase was found in the
Netherlands and Belgium. Secondly, the gap between the
countries where GPs have a relatively lower income
(Belgium, Sweden, France and Finland) and the coun-
tries where GPs have a higher income (Netherlands,
Germany and the UK) continues to exist over time.
Thirdly, the countries with comprehensive reforms are
the countries where GPs received the highest payments
already. The result of the comprehensive change seems
to be that GP income increased substantially in the two
or three years after the change. After that, the income
decreased somewhat. In the UK, an increase in income
was intended [27,28], but the increase was higher than
foreseen [27]. In Belgium, the increase in income was
also intended to make the profession more attractive in
comparison with other medical specialties [16]. In the
Netherlands, the change was intended to be budget
neutral, as in Germany.
Fourthly, on average, GPs working in countries with a
strong primary care sector in terms of governance, work-
force development, access, and coordination of care ap-
pear to have a substantial higher income than GPs
working in countries with a medium or weak primary care
sector. We found no association between income develop-
ment and the continuity of primary care. Perhaps this can
be explained by the fact that having a long-term relation-
ship with patients, keeping medical records, and creating
a feeling of trust is a universal feature of primary care and
inherent to the profession of GPs, irrespective of their
income level, while governance, workforce development,
access, and coordination of care are largely influenced bypolicies and financial incentives. It is unclear why GPs in
countries with a comprehensive service delivery earn less
compared to their colleagues in countries with a less com-
prehensive service delivery. The dimension of comprehen-
siveness was mainly based on expert opinion, whereas the
other dimensions are based on more robust data [10].
Maybe experts tend to overestimate the comprehensive-
ness in their country. All in all, the results seem to suggest
that in countries with a better organized primary health
care system, GPs have a relatively stronger position in the
system and are also able to use this position to their own
benefit, i.e. by ensuring a higher income.
Policy makers have tried to curb the unintended in-
creases in income in the UK and the Netherlands. In the
UK, the GMS contract of 2004 was valid for three years.
So the first year of possible measures to curb the in-
crease in income was 2007. In the following years, net
remuneration of GPs was either frozen or increased with
only a (partial) compensation for inflation [27,33]. The
quality and outcomes framework was adjusted several
times. The idea behind the changes was to continuously
improve the quality of the general practice. The effect
was that income of GPs in real terms decreased after the
initial GMS contract had ended, but remained higher
than the level before the reform. In the Netherlands,
where a budget neural transition was envisaged, the un-
foreseen increase led to a claim on GPs to repay the
excess, which is currently under discussion between rep-
resentatives of the GPs and the Ministry of Health.
Limitations of the study
An important limitation of this study is that we only
present average incomes of GPs. The variation in income
within countries in the case of non-salaried GPs are
large. Evidence for this is found in Belgium [35], the
Netherlands [36], Germany [37] and the UK [38].
A problem in calculating GP income from the total
revenue is the increasing complexity of the financing of
GP practices. The emergence of new payment systems,
such as the integrated care fees and new health profes-
sionals working for GPs, such as nurse practitioners,
make it difficult to establish the expenditure of GPs,
since for instance health care consumption of specialist
care of patients on the GP’s list have to be paid by the
GP(−practice). There is no longer a relationship between
workload (in number of patients or number of services)
and remuneration. This will make it difficult to monitor
GP-expenditure in the future.
We have tried to relate the development in GP income
to the context of primary care. However, we are aware of
the fact that we only have eight countries in our study.
Therefore, the results should be seen as a first indication
of the association between income development and
primary care context.
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costs, the method of calculating GP income before and
after a drastic reform, the information on number of
active (fulltime) GPs, and the income derived from ser-
vices for private patients.
The most important problems in calculating GP in-
come in countries where GPs are self-employed entre-
preneurs are to calculate practice costs and to define
what is a full-time GP. Practice costs include salaries for
practice personnel, housing, medical equipment, trans-
portation etc.. The most reliable data on practice costs
come from tax data. However, this implies that the tax
office knows who are GPs and how many GPs are ac-
tively working as GP. Since this information is not al-
ways available, in some countries dedicated studies have
been carried out into this matter (as for instance in
Denmark, the Netherlands and Germany [39-41]. These
studies are usually not repeated on a yearly basis, thus
estimation methods have to be used to calculate practice
costs for the years where no data were available. Besides,
the outcome of the studies into practice costs are related
to the organization that initiates the study. Parties that
represent the interest of GPs often have a systematically
higher estimate compared to paying parties, such as gov-
ernments and health insurers [8]. The definition of what
is a full-time GP may change over time, leading to diffe-
rent income figures. In Belgium, for instance, a continu-
ous effort to improve the estimation of the GP’s context
lead to different methods of calculation and thus to dif-
ferent figures of GP income.
For the comparisons within countries, as a result of
changing remuneration methods, the calculation of the
income may contain different income components before
and after the reform. In the Netherlands, for instance, this
may underestimate the income of GPs before 2006, since
GPs may receive some extra remuneration through extra
allowance for practice management and from extra acti-
vities such as pap smears, health checks for drivers’ li-
cences, making an ECG etc. These income components
(besides influenza vaccination) are not included in the cal-
culations. However, the underestimation will not be so
large, that the difference between 2005 and 2006 can be
explained from this artefact. For the comparison between
countries, we have to note that there is an underestima-
tion of the income of GPs in Denmark, because the in-
come is based on head counts of GPs in stead of full-time
equivalents. There is a difference of around 20% for the
three years that data are available for both full-time GP
and income based on head count. However, since the
number of GPs has not changed substantially over the
years, we assume that the underestimation is constant
over time. In the data for Belgium, Denmark and France,
income from out-of-hours activities are included, whereas
this is excluded in the other countries, leading to a slightoverestimation of the income of Belgium, Danish and
French GPs compared to the other countries.
Finally, changes in GP remuneration may not be the
only cause of changes in income. Other developments,
such as increasing demand for GP services, ageing of the
population and substitution of hospital care to primary
care may also affect GP income. In the Netherlands, for
instance, there is evidence that part of the increase is
due to an increase in primary care use [42].
Conclusions
Summarizing, we found that comprehensive changes in
the remuneration system of GPs may influence GP in-
come considerably. Incremental changes are associated
with a gradual increase in income after correction for in-
flation, with the exception of Belgium where the incre-
mental change coincided with a considerable increase.
Beside the traditional payment systems, i.e. salary, capita-
tion fee, and fee-for-service, new payment systems have
been introduced to promote and reward quality and inte-
gration of care through financial incentives. Examples are
pay-for-performance, which is most elaborated in the UK,
and integrated care payment systems. The latter is still in
development and is facing problems due to the differences
in payment systems of the different health care providers
[7]. In countries with a strong primary structure, GP in-
come was on average higher, especially for countries with
a strong primary care governance. For the primary care
dimensions on service delivery, a strong access and coor-
dination of care were associated with a high GP income,
whereas a strong comprehensiveness and continuity of
services were associated with a lower GP income. We do
not have an explanation for this latter finding. In all coun-
tries, except Denmark, GP income increased more than
average wages. For the comparison of income between
countries, we have tried to harmonize the type of income
elements included in the calculations as much as possible,
but the available data were not always straightforwardly
comparable. Thus, the figures presented in this study
should be interpreted with caution. New payment forms,
such as integrated care payment systems, and new health
care professionals that are working for GPs, increasingly
blur the line between practice costs and income, making
it more and more important to define clearly the expen-
diture of GPs, to remain sight on the actual income of GPs.
Additional file
Additional file 1: Calculation of GP income.
Abbreviations
DRG: Diagnosis related groups; COPD: Chronic obstructive pulmonary
disease; CVA: Cerebrovascular accident; ECG: Electrocardiography; FTE: Full
time equivalents; GMF: General medical file; GMS: General medical services
contract; GP: General practitioner; NHS: National health service;
Kroneman et al. BMC Health Services Research 2013, 13:436 Page 13 of 14
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/13/436OECD: Organisation for economic co-operation and Development;
PMS: Personal medical services contract; US$: United States dollars in
purchasing power parities; QOF: Quality and outcomes framework;
UK: United Kingdom (in our case: England).
Competing interests
All authors declare to have no competing interest: no support from any
organisation for the submitted work; no financial relationships with any
organisations that might have an interest in the submitted work in the
previous 3 years; no other relationships or activities that could appear to
have influenced the submitted work.
Authors’ contributions
MK drafted the manuscript, carried out the analyses and collected the data.
PM carried out the calculations and analyses for Belgium. DSK provided the
data on primary care dimensions and helped with the interpretation and
helped to draft the manuscript. WG conducted a critical review of the
manuscript and helped with the analyses. JZ initiated the study, participated
in the design and helped to draft the manuscript. All authors read and
approved the final manuscript.
Acknowledgements
The authors are grateful to the national experts for reviewing and
commenting the text on their country. Any remaining errors are the
responsibility of the authors.
Funding
This research received no specific funding.
Author details
1NIVEL Netherlands Institute of Health Services Research, P.O Box 1568, 3500,
BN Utrecht, The Netherlands. 2RIZIV, 1150 Brussels, Belgium. 3Department of
Social Medicine, Academic Medical Centre, University of Amsterdam,
Amsterdam, The Netherlands. 4Department of Health Services Research,
Faculty of Health Medicine and Life Sciences, Maastricht University,
Maastricht, The Netherlands. 5Department of International Health, Faculty of
Health, Medicine and Life Sciences, Maastricht, The Netherlands.
Received: 15 May 2012 Accepted: 15 October 2013
Published: 24 October 2013
References
1. Gosden T, Forland F, Kristiansen IS, Sutton M, Leese B, Giuffrida A, et al:
Impact of payment method on behaviour of primary care physicians:
a systematic review. J Health Serv Res Policy 2001, 6:44–55.
2. Gosden T, Pedersen L, Torgerson D: How should we pay doctors?
a systematic review of salary payments and their effect on doctor
behaviour. QJM 1999, 92:47–55.
3. Bjorndal A, Arntzen E, Johansen A: Salaried and fee-for-service general
practitioners: is there a difference in patient turnover? Scand J Prim
Health Care 1994, 12:209–213.
4. Kristiansen IS, Mooney G: The general practitioner’s use of time: is it
influenced by the remuneration system? Soc Sci Med 1993, 37:393–399.
5. Sorensen RJ, Grytten J: Service production and contract choice in primary
physician services. Health Policy 2003, 66:73–93.
6. Gress S, Delnoij DMJ, Groenewegen PP: Managing primary care behaviour
through payment systems and financial incentives. In Primary care in the
driver’s seat? Organizational reform in European primary care. Edited by
Saltman RB, Rico A, Boerma WGW. Maidenhead: Open University Press;
2006:184–200.
7. Gress S, Focke A, Hessel F, Wasem J: Financial incentives for disease
management programmes and integrated care in German social health
insurance. Health Policy 2006, 78:295–305.
8. Kroneman MW, Van der Zee J, Groot W: Income development of general
practitioners in eight European countries from 1975 to 2005. BMC Health
Serv Res 2009, 9:26.
9. Kroneman M, Meeus P, Van der Zee J, Groot W: Income development of
general practitioners in eight european countries from 1975 to 2005:
the calculation of the belgian general practitioner revised. BMC Health
Serv Res 2009, 9:26.10. Kringos DS: The strength of primary care in Europe. Utrecht: Utrecht
University/NIVEL; 2012.
11. OECD: OECD health data files 2010, octobre 2010. Paris: OECD/IRDES; 2010.
Ref Type: Online source.
12. Kringos DS, Boerma W, Hutchinson A, Van der Zee J, Groenwegen PP:
The breadth of primary care: a systematic literature review of its core
dimensions. BMC Health Serv Res 2010, 10:65.
13. Kringos DS, Boerma W, Bourgueil Y, Cartier T, Hasvold T, Hutchinson A,
et al: The european primary care monitor: structure, process and
outcome indicators. BMC Fam Pract 2013, 11:81.
14. OECD: OECD health data 2012, definitions, sources and methods, health
expenditure and financing. Paris: OECD; 2012. 7-2-2013. Ref Type: Online Source.
15. Gerkens S, Merkur S: Belgium, health system review. Health Syst Transit
2010, 12:1–301.
16. RIZIV: Performantie van de huisartsgeneeskunde 2012 (samenvatting)
[performance of general practice 2012 (summary)]. Brussels: RIZIV; 2012:1–41.
17. European Observatory on Health Care Systems: Health care systems in
transition: belgium, 2000. Copenhagen: European Observatory on Health
Care Systems; 2000.
18. Strandberg-Larsen M, Nielsen MB, Vallgårda S, Krasnik A, Vrangbæk K:
Denmark: health system review. Transition: Health Systems in; 2007:9.
19. Sandier S, Paris V, Polton D: Health care systems in transition, France.
European Observatory on Health Care Systems: Copenhagen; 2004.
20. Caisse nationale de l'assurance maladie des travailleurs salariés: La carte de
france du médecin traitant [the french map of the médecin traitant].
En Action Le mensuel d’information des cadres de l’Assurance Maladie 2006, 49:9–9.
21. Chevreul K, Durand-Zaleski I, Bahrami S, Hernández-Quevedo C, Mladovsky
P: France: health system review. Health Syst Transit 2010, 12:1–326.
22. Bundesministerium für Gesundheit: Fragen und Antworten zur
Vergütungsreform. Stand 20. Bonn: Bundesministerium für Gesundheit; 2009.
Referat 224 . 2009. Ref Type: Edited Book.
23. Kassenärztliche Bundesvereinigung: Änderungen der Honorarverteilung zum 1.
Juli 2010. Berlin: Kassenärztliche Bundesvereinigung; 2010:1–3.
24. Gerlinger T: Health care reform in germany. German Pol Stud 2010,
6:107–142.
25. Kassenärztliche Bundesvereinigung: So wird die MGV aufgeteilt: Die Schritte
der Honorarverteilung. Berlin: Kassenärztliche Bundesvereinigung; 2010:1–2.
26. NIVEL: Aantal werkzame huisartsen naar functie en geslacht, op 1 januari
(vanaf 1975) [number of working GPs to function and sex]. http://www.nivel.
nl/databank. 2011. 1-11-2011. Ref Type: Electronic Citation.
27. National Audit Office: NHS Pay modernisation: New contracts for general
practice services in England. London: The Stationary Office; 2008:1–57.
28. Doran T, Fullwood C, Gravelle H, Reeves D, Kontopantelis E, Hiroeh U, et al:
Pay-for-performance programs in family practices in the United
Kingdom. N Engl J Med 2006, 355:375–384.
29. National Statistics, The Information Centre: National quality and outcomes
framework statistics for England 2006/07. Leeds: The Information Centre; 2007.
30. NHS Employers: Quality and outcomes framework. http://www.nhsemployers.
org/PayAndContracts/GeneralMedicalServicesContract/QOF/Pages/
QualityOutcomesFramework.aspx. 28-6-2012. Ref Type: Electronic Citation.
31. The Information Centre: GP earnings and expenses 2007/08 final report.
Leeds: The Information Centre; 2010:1–130.
32. Review Body on Doctors and Dentists Remuneration: Thirty-second report
2003. Norwich: The Stationery Office; 2003:1–94.
33. Department of Health: Information for the review body on doctors’ and
dentists’ remuneration from the department of health. London: Department
of Health; 2010:1–62.
34. Review Body on Doctors and Dentists Remuneration: Thirty-ninth report
2010. Norwich: The Stationary Office; 2010:1–138.
35. RIZIV: Jaarverslag 2007 - vierde deel: thematische uiteenzettingen. http://www.
inami.fgov.be/presentation/nl/publications/annual-report/2007/pdf/
ar2007p4.pdf, 1–37. 2008. Ref Type: Electronic Citation.
36. Jurling B, Koster L, Batterink M, Vunderink L, Schipper M, Karssen B: Praktijkkosten-
en inkomensonderzoek huisartsenzorg [practice costs and income study GP-care],
Volume Versie 1.0. Barneveld: Nederlandse Zorgautoriteit; 2012.
37. Zentralinstitut für die kassenärztliche Versorgung in Deutschland: Zi-praxis-
panel; Jahresbericht 2010. Wirtschaftliche Situation und Rahmenbedingungen
in der vertragsärztlichen Versorgung der Jahre 2006 bis 2008 [ZI-practice-panel;
annual report 2010. Economic situation and gneral conditions in GP care from
2006 until 2008]. Berlin: Zentralinstitut für die kassenärztliche Versorgung in
Deutschland; 2012.
Kroneman et al. BMC Health Services Research 2013, 13:436 Page 14 of 14
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/13/43638. Review Body on Doctors and Dentists Remuneration: Review for 2008;
written evidence from the health department for the United Kingdom. London:
Department of Health; 2007:1–94.
39. Praktiserende Lægers Organisation: PLO’s omkostningsundersøgelse 2009.
Kopenhagen: Praktiserende Lægers Organisation; 2010:1–23.
40. Karssen B, Schipper M, Jurling B: Praktijkkosten en opbrengsten van
huisartsenpraktijken. Barneveld: Significant; 2009:1–89.
41. Brenner G: Kostenstrukturanalyse in der ärztlichen und psychotherapeutischen
vertragspraxis 2001. Slides: Zentralinstitut für die kassenärztliche Versorgung
in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland; 2003.
42. Van Dijk CE, Verheij RA, Van den Hoogen H, De Bakker DH: Bekostiging van
de huisartsenzorg: eindrapportage [paying for general practice care: final
report]. Utrecht: NIVEL; 2009:1–51.
doi:10.1186/1472-6963-13-436
Cite this article as: Kroneman et al.: International developments in
revenues and incomes of general practitioners from 2000 to 2010.
BMC Health Services Research 2013 13:436.Submit your next manuscript to BioMed Central
and take full advantage of: 
• Convenient online submission
• Thorough peer review
• No space constraints or color ﬁgure charges
• Immediate publication on acceptance
• Inclusion in PubMed, CAS, Scopus and Google Scholar
• Research which is freely available for redistribution
Submit your manuscript at 
www.biomedcentral.com/submit
